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NON-TECHNICAL SYMMARY
John Bennett, Saul Estrin, James Maw and Giovanni Urga, ‘Privatisation Methods
and Economic Growth in Transition Economies.’ Summary
This paper investigates the impact of different privatisation methods on national
economic performance in transition economies. These can influence growth directly
through differentiate effects on enterprise performance, and indirectly via the impact
of privatisation revenues on the provision of infrastructure and networks.  Our
approach is to estimate a growth equation over 23 countries for the period 1990-2001.
We find that  GDP growth is significantly influenced by investment, employment
growth and the growth of labour quality. Several institutional elements specific to the
transition process, notably the private sector share and capital market development,
are also found to be significant determinants.
While theory would suggest that ‘full privatisation’ (direct sale)s would generate the
maximum direct enhancement of company performance and provide the greatest
indirect effect via government revenue that may be spent on infrastructure, we are
unable to identify either element in the growth process. There is also evidence in
some specifications that ‘mixed privatisation’ (which includes MEBOs) not only fails
to enhance growth, but may act as a hindrance. The most striking result, however,
concerns mass privatisation, which is found to have a significant effect on growth
across a wide variety of definitions and specifications. The result holds with particular
force after 1995, i.e., once the period of early transition and recession was over. Our
analysis suggests that, in addition to political factors, economic factors were at work
favouring mass privatisation. An advantage of mass privatisation was that, unlike full
privatisation, it led spontaneously to some development of the capital market, and this
is significantly correlated with economic growth.3
1.  Introduction
From the outset of the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union from socialism to capitalism, privatisation was identified as a central
component of reform (Berg and  Sachs, 1990;  Estrin, 1994).  It was intended to
address the fundamental issues of enterprise inefficiency and lack of market
orientation and innovation that characterised socialism ( Ellman, 1989).  However,
transition economies suffered from a paucity of domestic savings and an
underdeveloped institutional framework, particularly with respect to capital markets.
It was therefore realised, soon after the arrival in power of reform governments from
1989 onward, that conventional methods of privatisation - by tender and through
public offerings - would not always be appropriate (Blanchard  et al., 1991).
Considerable effort was put into developing new methods, including widespread use
of manager-employee buyouts (MEBOs) and mass privatisation – the ‘sale’ of firms
at zero or nominal price, through the issue to the general population of vouchers or
privatisation certificates.
3 In this paper we examine the impact that the alternative
privatisation methods used in the transition have had on national economic
performance.
An extensive literature exists that addresses how different privatisation methods may
have influenced the structure of private ownership post-privatisation: whether it was
outsider- or insider-dominated, and whether it was concentrated or dispersed (Nellis,
2000). Privatisation using traditional methods of sale to the highest bidder is found
typically to have led to outsider ownership, in the cases of Hungary and Estonia with
a high proportion of foreign participation. Privatisation through leased buyout or
                                                
3 Mass privatisation schemes originated in the early 1990s in Czechoslovakia and Poland, were used in
Russia in 1994, and were later imitated in various countries.4
MEBO has led to insider ownership, often dominated by managers and sometimes
with a large retained state ownership share (e.g., Romania and Slovenia). The
consequences of mass privatisation for ownership have been more complex. In Russia
and Ukraine, the way that the process operated led to widespread insider ownership
(Estrin and Wright, 1999), while in the Czech Republic and Poland, mass
privatisation was constructed to ensure primarily outsider ownership (Coffee, 1996).
The huge literature on the impact of privatisation on firm performance in transition
economies,
4 which is summarised in Djankov and Murrell (2002), confirms that in the
leading transition countries, privatisation resulted in the predicted improvements in
financial performance and productivity (see also Megginson and Netter, 2001; EBRD,
2002). Outsider ownership has generally enhanced performance more than insider
ownership has, but the institutional environment has also been relevant. Privatisation
is typically found to have had a smaller impact on firm performance in Russia than in
Central Europe, and  Djankov and  Murrell follow the literature in relating this to
widespread insider ownership and underdeveloped capital markets (see also Nellis,
2002; Stiglitz, 2002).
Each of the studies noted above looked at firms in one or several countries. Our focus,
however, is on the dispersion in national economic performance across (almost) all
the economies in transition. This dispersion is relatively wide, even though most
transition economies followed a similar cocktail of policies (the ‘Washington
consensus’): privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation. The early league tables of
the EBRD, for example, drew sharp distinctions in terms of qualitative indicators of
‘progress in transition’ between the successful economies of Central Europe, the more
                                                
4 E.g., Earle and Estrin, 1997; Jones et al., 1998; Claessens and Djankov, 1999; and Frydman et al.,
1999.5
patchy performances in the Baltics and Balkans, and the generally dismal record of
the rest of the former Soviet Union (EBRD, 1994). The variance in growth and
inflation rates was established empirically by Gomulka (1995) and Aslund, Boone and
Johnson (1996), while Blanchard and  Kremer (1997) explained the dispersion in
performance on the basis of ‘disorganisation.’ More recently, attempts have also been
made to explain the dispersion by political factors ( Aslund, 1999), policy errors
(Stiglitz, 1999) and capital market differences (Berglof and Bolton, 2002).
Despite the central role attributed to privatisation in the transition literature -
according to some, privatisation ‘is’ transition (see the discussion by Brada, 1996) - it
has rarely been analysed as a source of the inter-country dispersion in national
economic performance. Indeed, it has frequently been asserted that differences in
privatisation methods have had little effect on aggregate performance (see Djankov
and  Murrell, 2002).  The literature dealing with the macroeconomic aspects of
privatisation at the theoretical or empirical level is sparse, an exception being Hansen
(1997), who examines technology choices under different privatisation schemes and
considers how these may bring about multiple equilibria at the macro level. Also,
Schipke (2001) sketches some general macroeconomic themes related to privatisation,
but does not develop a theoretical model or undertake econometric analysis, while
Bennett, Estrin and Maw (2002) examine a government’s optimal privatisation policy,
taking into account the general equilibrium interactions between firms, but do not
consider empirics.
Our analysis covers a variety of ways in which the method of privatisation may
influence economic growth. The first is as a form of neutral technical progress,
deriving primarily from the hypothesised improvement in efficiency at the firm level.6
Different methods of privatisation may lead to different dominant ownership
structures, with differentiated impacts on firm performance. Second, privatisation may
result in network externalities. We therefore examine how the method of privatisation
may have interacted with the share of the private sector in total output to produce
economic growth. Third, privatisation may generate development of the capital
market, and so we examine the interaction between privatisation method and capital
market development as a further potential source of economic growth. Fourth, we
allow for the fact that different privatisation methods also generate different amounts
of revenue for the government, thereby impacting on its ability to spend on
infrastructure, and so, potentially, to generate economic growth ( Aghion and
Schankerman, 1999).
5
To identify the direct and indirect impacts of privatisation methods on national
economic performance, we estimate an aggregate growth model for the 23 economies
in transition for which consistent and reasonably reliable data are available from 1990
to 2001.
 6 In addition to factor inputs, we control for the share of the private sector and
capital market development, and other potential determinants of growth. Our
regressions provide a robust description of the growth process, but, contrary to
expectations from the microeconomics literature, we find that it is mass privatisation,
rather than the other privatisation methods, that enhances growth under a wide variety
of assumptions.  Private sector shares and capital market development also interact to
                                                
5 Around the world, raising revenues to support government expenditure has been a significant
motivation for privatisation (Schipke, 2001) – ‘selling the family silver.’ This motivation has been
particularly strong in the cash-strapped government offices of transition economies (Barr, 1993; World
Bank, 1996).
6 Our data set covers all the transition countries listed by EBRD (2002) except for Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and Yugoslavia; i.e., it covers Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.7
improve national economic performance. However, we fail to identify an impact of
government capital expenditure on growth.
In Section 2 we outline briefly our conceptual framework, and in Section 3 we discuss
the specification of the estimating equations and the data used. The results are
reported in Section 4, while in Section 5, which concludes, we interpret our findings.
The large variety of data sources that we use is reported in the Appendix.
2. Theoretical Framework
In this section we first define our classification of privatisation methods and then
specify equations for real aggregate demand and supply, in each of which the method
of privatisation is an argument. Combining these equations, we obtain an expression
in which real GDP depends on the method of privatisation and a variety of other
factors. In first-difference form, this expression will be the basis for our empirical
work.
We distinguish three alternative privatisation methods.
7 The first is full privatisation,
where the dominant form of privatisation in an economy is the sale of firms for a
positive price. The second is  mass privatisation, where the dominant form of
privatisation is that firms are sold at a zero (or nominal) price. The third category is
mixed privatisation, which covers all cases that are not adequately represented by
either of the first two categories, and includes MEBOs and leased buyouts. Of the
three methods, full privatisation typically yields the most revenue, at least in the short
term, while mass privatisation yields the least. A dummy variable representing the
three methods of privatisation is an argument in the growth equation that we estimate.
                                                
7 For other schemes of classification see Estrin (1994) and Roland (2000).8
In the empirical literature on growth it is common to employ a Cobb-Douglas
production function and assume that each economy is close to its steady-state growth
path (e.g.,  Barro, 1991). This simplifies analysis considerably. Yet, by definition,
transition economies are significantly out of steady state. It may take many more
years than the decade or so that transition has been underway for the assumption of
steady-state growth to be an adequate approximation for empirical analysis. We
therefore use a general formulation of the determinants of real GDP, and thus
economic growth, with minimal restrictions on functional form, but in which a wide
range of independent variables is specified.
We begin by specifying, for a given country and given time, real aggregate demand
d y  and real aggregate supply 
s y . Our formulation of real aggregate demand, where





In addition to depending negatively on the real price level  p , 
d y  is assumed to
depend on the method of privatisation  M and employment  L. If there is mass
privatisation, the recipients of shares may feel richer, and this real wealth effect may
raise their demand for goods.
8 Given imperfect capital markets, the expenditure
involved with the other methods of privatisation may leave the buyers of firms short
of liquidity, which will have a negative effect on demand, at least in the short term.
However, this effect may be rather small for full privatisation because the number of
buyers is relatively small. The employment term  L appears in equation (1) because it
is assumed that firms employ surplus labour. We therefore expect employment to9
affect real aggregate demand positively, but to be of little consequence  for real
aggregate supply.
We assume that real aggregate supply depends positively on the real price level and is





Here,  P  is the share of the private sector in national income;  S  is a measure of
capital market development;  K  is the private sector capital stock;  A is the human
capital stock and  G  is the public sector infrastructure capital stock. We assume
without comment that  K  and  A affect 
s y positively, and focus our discussion on the
other variables.
Consider first the role of  M . It may be expected that full privatisation, being
associated with relatively concentrated ownership, will lead to the most effective
corporate governance of our three types of privatisation. However,  MEBOs and
leased buyouts, which we include in our mixed privatisation category, may lead to
managerial and worker entrenchment, and therefore be least effective with respect to
corporate governance. Assuming that more effective corporate governance raises real
aggregate supply, this suggests that direct sale  has the strongest, and mixed
privatisation the weakest, effect on 
s y
9.
                                                                                                                                           
8 Insofar as the other methods of privatisation underprice shares, we may expect similar effects on
demand, though generally less than for mass privatisation.
9 The method of privatisation may also affect incentives within the firm and the amount of investment
in restructuring it undertakes. However, apart from the relatively uncommon case of the sale of a firm
to a foreign investor, the literature finds that such microeconomic differences are relatively small
initially (see Carlin, Van Reenan and Wolfe, 1995; Djankov and Murrell, 2002).10
Private sector output has two sources - privatised firms and  de  novo  firms. An
increase in the output of either, as a proportion of national income, may raise 
s y . We
noted above the well-documented positive effect of privatisation on productivity at
the microeconomic level. The sources of this gain include the better definition of
corporate goals by private firms and some resolution of the incentive problems
associated with the softer budget constraints of state-owned enterprises (Kornai, 1992;
Vickers and Yarrow, 1998; Roland and Sekkat, 2001). The major contribution made
by small and medium-sized de novo firms stems from their ability to fill the gaps left
under communism by biases towards high capital intensity and against the provision
of services (EBRD, 1999). Also, private sector development may generate network
externalities, with repeated market transactions creating a climate of trust, raising
business confidence (Roland and Verdier, 1994; Sacco and Scarpa, 2000).
The development of capital markets, as represented by  S , is in principle associated
with more widespread and cheaper finance, reducing the need for firms to rely on
internally-generated funds for investment, thereby raising 
s y . There is now a large
body of empirical evidence supporting this view (see, e.g.,  Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 1998). Moreover, the larger proportion of output that comes from the
private sector, the greater is the scope for taking advantage of capital market
development. Thus, we expect that:
(3)
2 /0.
s yPS ¶¶¶>       
The public sector infrastructure capital stock,  G , includes physical infrastructure,
such as roads and telecommunications, and institutional infrastructure, such as the
framework for the enforcement of laws to protect property rights. Outside the11
transition context, it is recognised in the literature on economic growth that there is a
trade-off between government expenditure, if it is productive, and the raising of
distortionary taxes to finance the government expenditure (Barro, 1990; Barro and
Sala i Martin, 1995). Thus, ‘productive’ government expenditure raises (lowers) the
growth rate if it is at less (more) than the optimal level. The empirical literature
provides mixed results (see, e.g.,  Kneller,  Bleaney and  Gemmell, 1999). In
transitional economies, privatisation programmes are a non-distortionary source of
revenue, so productive investment financed by this revenue will have a positive
impact on growth. However, a large proportion of public investment is financed in
other ways, in particular, by highly  distortionary taxation. Also, the transition
economies’ past performance in infrastructure investment - from the communist era -
exhibited extreme inefficiency (see World Bank, 1996). Hence, we may expect at best
a weak positive relationship between public sector investment and real aggregate
supply.
Let  y denote real GDP. Setting 
ds yy = , we can solve (1) and (2) for  p :
(4)       (,,,,,,) pMLPSKAG r = .
Substituting (4) into (2) and writing 
s yy = , we obtain
(5)      [ ] (,,,,,,),,,,,,(,,,,,,)
s yYMLPSKAGMPSKAGYMLPSKAG r =” ,
which is increasing in  (,,,,) LPSKA, and may be increasing in  G . Putting together
our comments concerning the effect on 
d Y  and 
s Y of each privatisation method
suggests that, compared to the other methods of privatisation, the direct effect of12
mixed privatisation will be a low level of  y , but the ranking of the other two methods
in this respect is unclear.
3.  Specification and Data
In this section we first outline how our model is developed for the purposes of
estimation and discuss our estimation methods.  We then discuss the data used in the
regressions, and present summary statistics and definitions.  Details of the various
sources for our data are given in the Appendix.
Equation (5) is the basis for our empirical work.  Our approach is to estimate a cross-
country growth model along the lines of e.g. Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992) and Levine and Zervos (1993).  However, we supplement the standard model
relating GDP growth to factor inputs with indicators of private sector development,
privatisation method, capital market development and government capital
expenditure.  Similar methodology has been applied to privatisation in developing
countries (Barnett, 2000; Cook and Uchida, 2002) and capital market development
(Edison et al., 2002; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2000,
Henry, 2000, Reyes and Urga 2002).
We therefore estimate a model of the form:
(6)     dGDPit= a1   + a2dINVit + a3dEMPit +a4dIHCit +a5STOCKMCit + a6PRIVit
                                             +a7GIS   + a8 FULLit + a9MASSit +a10MIXEDit + Eit
where d is the difference operator, t denotes time and i country, GDP represents the
log of gross domestic product (y), EMP is the log of employment (L), INV is the log
change in the capital stock (gross fixed capital formation, K), HP (log of investment13
in human capital, A) is our indicator of labour quality (gross enrolment in tertiary
education) and STOCKMC is the measure of stock market development (stock market
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, S). The three methods of privatisation (M) are
Full, Mass and Mixed, and government expenditure on infrastructure (G) is measured
by the share of investment in total government expenditure (GIS). The estimation
period is the twelve years 1990 – 2001 and we use data from all the transition
countries listed by EBRD (2002) except for Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Yugoslavia,
for which data were not available in most years.
We use panel data analysis (within-groups estimators) to exploit both time-series and
cross-section variation in data, and in particular in the relationship between growth
and privatisation method. We also compare the performance of model (6) with its
dynamic counterpart. As indicated in equation (6), we have estimated equation (5) in
first-difference form, thus taking out country-specific fixed effects. We test for time-
specific as well as country-specific fixed effects in each regression.
The average values for the economic variables used in the estimations – the growth of
GDP capital stock, employment, IHC and government capital expenditure as a share
of GDP – are reported in Table 1.  Over the entire period, the unweighted mean of
GDP growth was negative, at -1.5%, with negative average growth concentrated in
the countries of the former Soviet Union.  GDP growth was highest on average in
Estonia, closely followed by Poland, and lowest in Moldova.  Though investment
declined on average by more than GDP in the majority of countries, the variance was
high and it grew quite rapidly in a few countries like Georgia, though from a very low
base.  Employment also declined on average over the region, by slightly more than the
decline in GDP, though with less variance.  Employment actually grew on average in14
only one country – the Kyrgyz Republic – and fell quite steeply on average in
Bulgaria and Macedonia.  This gradual decline over a long period in employment in
almost every country, and the implied decline in GDP per capita in most, confirms
that there must have been significant over-employment everywhere at the start of
transition, and that this may not have been fully eradicated even by the end of our
sample period.  This suggests that economies may not be operating on the technical
frontier of their aggregate production function, so that the estimated coefficients on
employment might be lower than would predict in market economics.  The index of
human capital (IHC) shows a modest increase on average in most countries, with the
unweighted mean rising by 4.7%, and a slightly smaller standard deviation.  Human
capital improvements were particularly marked in Hungary and Poland and in two
countries of the former Soviet Union – the Kyrgyz Republic and Latvia.  The
proportion of the population enrolled in tertiary education actually declined on
average in two countries, Armenia and Uzbekistan.  Finally, we see that the share of
government capital expenditure in GDP tended to rise on average over the period.
This masks considerable variation across countries.  In 10 countries, the share fell,
most markedly in Moldova, but it also increased sharply in some countries, most
notably Bulgaria and Croatia.
Our study is focused on the impact of different privatisation methods on growth. We
employ three dummy variables to explore this relationship: full privatisation, mixed
privatisation and mass privatisation.
10 These dummies have both a cross-section and
                                                
10 There are various that we might identify the dominant method of privatisation chosen in each
country.  We have explored the effects of using three different approaches.  The first was based on
searches through the government websites to read the official reports in each country of privatisation
method.  The second was to draw on external documentary sources, e.g., Earle,  Frydman,
Rapacyzynski, Turkewitz (1994), Bohm (1995) and World Bank (1996).  The third was to use the
EBRD’s classification of country. Of the 23 countries considered, 5 shifted category when the
approach was changed. For this paper, we decided to report the regressions using the third approach
because it derives from a single source and does not rely on the subjective judgements of our research15
time-series dimension.  We specify the chosen method of privatisation in each country
as belonging to one these three categories, and then identify the date in which this
privatisation method was introduced.  This allows us to create three dummy variables,
one for each method of privatisation. In each case the dummy variable equals zero in
the years before the relevant method of privatisation was introduced and unity
thereafter.
The classification of privatisation method by year and country is presented in Table 2.
The two columns on the right report the  EBRD’s classification of primary and
secondary privatisation methods.  We have transformed this into our categories as
follows.  When the EBRD primary method is voucher, we classify privatisation as
‘mass.’  When it is direct sales, we classify privatisation as ‘full.’ In all other cases we
classify privatisation as ‘mixed.’ In Table 3, we report the main time line of
privatisation activities (the ‘privatisation chronicle’) for each of our sample countries.
In the right-hand column, we report the primary privatisation method.  The year in
which the main privatisation method and activity concur is represented in bold, and is
reported as the ‘year of privatisation’ in Table 2.
Finally, we include in equation (6) both the private sector share in GDP, to control for
the impact of private sector development including  de novo growth on GDP, and
stock market capitalisation, as a share of GDP, to indicate the level of development of
the capital market.  Other studies (see Bekaert and Harvey, 2000, Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad, 2000, Henry, 2000, Reyes and Urga, 2002) have stressed the role of capital
market development on economic growth, especially in the transition context (see
                                                                                                                                           
team. However, all the equations were estimated using all three definitions, and none of the results
were significantly affected if either of the other two approaches was used instead. This considerably
increases our confidence in the robustness of our findings. The regressions are available from the
authors on request.16
Berglof and Bolton, 2002; EBRD, 1996).  We predict both to have a positive effect on
national economic development.  However, since the effectiveness of private
ownership in improving managerial performance depends to a considerable extent on
the depth, liquidity and efficiency of the capital market, we also interact the two
measures in some of empirical analysis.
4.  Results
We first estimate equation (6) across the whole data set for our basic results.  We then
address issues of dynamics and  endogeneity using GMM methods. Finally, we
undertake a number of tests for sensitivity of the results.  In Table 4 we report the
basic equation with interaction effects. The equations fit well with the adjusted 
2 R  in
excess of 0.6 and a joint Wald test of 130.  The country- and time-dummy Wald tests
confirm the relevance of fixed effects in the equation, and indicate that
autocorrelation is not present.  The country-fixed effects are a particularly important
element in the explanation (
2 2703 c = ).
Despite the very strong impact of country- and time-specific factors in the transition
growth process, the equation provides a sensible and conventional explanation of
national economic performance in terms of factor inputs, including labour quality.
The coefficient on investment is highly significant ad values are estimated to be
within the normal range.  The coefficient on employment is also significant, but, as
expected, the considerable labour hoarding and excess employment of the socialist era
results in estimated coefficients that are lower than would typically pertain in Western
economies. There is a modest but significant impact of labour quality on GDP and a
significant impact from the development of the stock market on GDP growth.  The
negative coefficient on the interactive term suggests that the growth-enhancing effects17
of capital sector development tail off as the economy approaches a more conventional
Western ownership and capital market structure.
The most striking results in Table 4 concern the dummy variables for method of
privatisation.  Full privatisation is not found to have any independent influence on
growth. This suggests that neither the direct impact, nor the indirect macro-economic
externality through increased infrastructure expenditure, is operating in the transition
economies in this period. The latter inference is strengthened when we take into
account that the coefficient on the share of the government capital expenditure growth
is not significant. In fact, correlation coefficients confirm that there is almost no
relationship between full privatisation and government capital expenditure (r<0.05).
This suggests that transition governments did not choose to spend incremental
revenues from privatisation on capital goods.  The lack of significance of government
capital expenditure in the growth process suggests that the reform governments in the
region have been unable to solve the problems of capital allocation that had
bedevilled their socialist predecessors (see Barr, 1990; Ellman 1989). This may have
been because of low administrative competence in the state sector (see EBRD, 2000).
However, Table 4 reveals that mass privatisation has a positive and significant
independent effect on the growth process.  A clue to the interpretation can be gleaned
from the modest correlation between mass privatisation and the private sector share
(the correlation coefficient is around 0.3).  The private sector share is not correlated
with either of the other two privatisation methods (the correlation coefficient is less
than 0.1).  This suggests that mass privatisation schemes played an important role in
kick starting or encouraging the broader growth of the private sector, thereby18
enhancing the growth process.  Mixed privatisation, like full privatisation, is found
not to have independent effects on economic development.
Before we can have confidence in these results, we must address issues of dynamics
and endogeneity.  We therefore estimate a dynamic version of the model with a
lagged dependent variable. The presence of the lagged dependent variable induces per
se correlation between this regressor and the error term. Thus, we used the
generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation developed for dynamic panel
data by Arellano and Bond (1991), addressing potential problems of endogeneity of
the explanatory variables by instrumenting on lagged values. GMM also allows us to
address the correlation between the error term and the lagged endogenous variable
(see Edison et al., 2002). The results, which are presented in Table 5, are not greatly
different from those reported in Table 4.  The lagged dependent variable is significant
in OLS but not in GMM.  Despite its presence, and instrumentation of all the
economic variables (investment, employment, labour quality and government
expenditure), the pattern of the results is more or less unchanged, though there is
some evidence for endogeneity of employment.  The dynamic specification and the
control for potential endogeneity bring out even more sharply the results with respect
to private sector share, capital market development and method of privatisation.  In
particular, we find that the positive impact of mass privatisation on growth is
significant at the 99% level in both columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, and mixed
privatisation is also significant in column (2).  However, neither full privatisation nor
government expenditure is statistically significant in either formulation.
A second important line of enquiry is to undertake sensitivity tests as a check for
robustness. In Table 6, we explore the time patterns of the growth process, re-19
estimating the basic equation of Table 4 with and without interactions between the
private sector share and stock market development on each of the two sub-periods
1990-1995 and 1996-2001. The validity of the selected period is supported by the
129 . 109 ) 10 (
2 = c , though the explanation has less economic content with so many
fewer degrees of freedom.  The equation for the early period fits rather less well than
for the later, and the explanation of the growth process relies rather more on the
country- and time-fixed effects.  Given the recession in most countries in this sub-
period, it is unsurprising that the coefficient on employment growth is not statistically
significant, suggesting that economies were operating within the aggregate technology
frontier with respect to employment.  The equations suggest, however, that growth
was influenced by investment and by the quality of the labour force, even in the 1990-
1995 period, though not by government investment.  The results on privatisation
method, stock market development and private sector share are disappointing but
perhaps not surprising.  None of the coefficients are significant, probably reflecting
the fact that most values were zero in most countries in those early years.
The contrast with the two equations for the second sub-period is striking.  The fit is
comparable to that for the whole period, though the time fixed effects are not
significant and are excluded.  The main economic variables are significant despite the
loss of degrees of freedom, and the private sector share and stock market development
are significant, with or without interactions. The coefficient on the mass privatisation
method dummy is statistically significant at the 99% level, but full privatisation is still
not found to have any significant effect on economic growth. Mixed privatisation has
a negative effect, and this is actually significant in the interactive specification. These
regressions have to be treated with caution however, because of the sample size, but
they suggest that capital market development, private sector growth and privatisation20
only began to influence the growth process in transition economies in the second half
of the 1990s.
A second check for robustness concerns whether the privatisation method dummies
proxy for other unidentified variables of significance in the transition growth process.
The framework of equation (5) suggests that we should examine carefully the role of
capital market development and government investment in infrastructure in our
sensitivity analysis. We therefore estimated equations in which alternative measures
of both capital market development and government capital expenditure were used.
For the former, we replace stock market capitalisation by the EBRD (1996, 2002)
indices for Banking Reform and Non-Banking Reform.
11  For the latter, we replaced
government capital expenditure by the EBRD (1996, 2002) index of Infrastructure
Reform.
The results are reported in Table 7. It can be seen that the change has little effect on
the underlying structure of the estimated equations. The fit remains similar, as does
the central role in the explanation of country- and time-fixed effects. The coefficients
and standard errors on the factor inputs, including labour quality, are also not affected
greatly by either change. In column (1) we report the equation that uses EBRD indices
on capital market development. These prove not to be significant.
12 The coefficient on
mass privatisation method is robust to the change in specification.  In column (2), we
report the equation using the EBRD Infrastructure Index. As in Table 4, the
coefficient on the variable proxying for government provision of infrastructure and
capital goods is not significant.  This strengthens the interpretation that the quality of
public sector decision-making and management in transition economies may have
                                                
11 For the two years prior to the start of the EBRD series, we applied the values for 1992.21
been poor in this period.  However, the coefficient remains insignificant, and is not
correlated with full privatisation (or either of the other privatisation-method
dummies). Once again, the result on mass privatisation is found to be robust to this
change of specification.
We undertook several other experiments.  First, we divided the data set into the CIS
and non-CIS countries, a division that was found to be statistically significant
( 01 . 59 ) 10 (
2 = c ). The results of this regression are reported in Table 8, and the same
broad pattern of results as in Table 4 hold with respect to many of the long-run supply
factors and institutional development. Moreover, full and mixed privatisation were not
significant. However, mass privatisation was found to have a significant strong
positive effect in the CIS countries, but a weak negative one in the non- CIS
countries. Though the result is suggestive, and consistent with the interpretation of
Djankov and Murrell (2002), we do not attach great significance to it because the
degrees of freedom are relatively small (71 and 109) and in these equations, some of
key economic variables – employment and labour quality – are not significant. Since
the status of Belarus has also been questioned as a transition economy – for example
the level of privatisation is very low – we also re-estimated the equations with Belaus
excluded. The results are reported in Table 9 and are virtually the same as in Table 4.
Finally, to address the question of the impact of demand-side variables in the growth
process, we re-estimated the basic equation of Table 4 to include both the exchange
rate (annual average in US dollars) and oil price
13.  The former has clearly played an
important role in growth process of many transition process of many transition
                                                                                                                                           
12 When the period is divided into two sub-periods, the non-banking sector index along with the private
sector share index became statistically significant at the 95% level.  These equations are not reported.
13 It is worth noticing that in our previous estimated equations those effects were captured, though
indistinguishable, by the time dummies.22
economies (see World Bank, (1996) and the latter is likely to be a significant factor in
the growth performance of several CIS countries.  The results are reported in Table
10,  and confirm that higher dollar exchange rates have acted significantly to reduce
growth rates while higher oil prices have increased them.  However, these variables
seem more or less orthogonal to the other determinants of growth, and their inclusion
does not affect our conclusions on the impact of different privatisation methods. Each
was weakly significant but did not greatly affect the other coefficients or standard
errors.
5.  Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of differences in privatisation method on
national economic performance in transition economies. Our approach has been to
estimate, using panel data methods, a growth equation over 23 countries for the period
1990-2001. We find that growth is driven primarily by country- and time-specific
factors, but is also significantly influenced by investment, employment growth and
the growth of labour quality. Several institutional elements specific to the transition
process, notably the private sector share and capital market development, are also
found to be significant determinants of economic development in our sample.
Our findings concerning privatisation methods may at first be found surprising.
While theory would suggest that full privatisation would generate the maximum direct
enhancement of company performance and provide the greatest indirect effect via
government revenue that may be spent on infrastructure, we are unable to identify
either element in the growth process. Our interpretation is that the direct impact
through improved corporate governance is in fact being picked up in our factor inputs,
especially investment.  Thus, direct sale might be having its main effect through23
access to financial resources, enabling firms to invest, rather than via increased
technical efficiency.
While full privatisation is found not to have the predicted effects on growth, there is
evidence in some specifications that mixed privatisation not only fails to enhance
growth, but may act as a hindrance. The most striking result, however, concerns mass
privatisation, which is found to have a significant effect on growth across a wide
variety of definitions and specifications. The result holds with particular force after
1995, i.e., once the period of early transition and recession was over
A positive effect of mass privatisation on economic growth can be explained by
political factors, but our results suggest that economic factors have also been at
work.
14 Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) make the political argument that the free
distribution of shares to agents such as managers and workers, who might try to block
privatisation, can be an effective way of buying off their opposition. A similar
argument can be applied after mass privatisation, when the ownership stakes of
managers and workers can be effective in maintaining their support. Our analysis also
suggests an economic case for mass privatisation.
15 It is frequently argued that an
advantage of full privatisation is that it leads to concentrated ownership and short
agency chains, whereas mass privatisation has the converse effects (see, e.g., Coffee,
1996; Stiglitz, 1999). However, in any economy the ability to purchase a firm, or at
least a substantial ownership share, is imperfectly correlated with the skills required to
                                                
14 Concerns that have been expressed about the ownership structures (Estrin and Wright, 1999),
corporate governance (Coffee, 1996) and supporting institutions (see  Stiglitz, 1999) may still be
appropriate, but such factors are, on average, insufficient to counteract the benefits of mass
privatisation across our 23 transition economies.
15 Related arguments about mass privatisation as a positive force appeared in the the early literature on
transition (see Blanchard et al., 1991). These views fell into disrepute because of the many excesses
associated with mass privatisation, particularly in Russia (see  Nellis, 2000).  However, our paper24
run the firm efficiently. In an economy with an extremely underdeveloped capital
market, ‘wrong’ owners will tend to persist for longer. An advantage of mass
privatisation is that, unlike full privatisation, it leads spontaneously to some
development of the capital market, which, as we have seen, is significantly correlated
with economic growth.
  16 In the Czech Republic, for example, the distribution of
shares at nominal cost to the general public led to shares being placed in the hands of
privatisation funds, which exerted pressure on managers to be relatively efficient.
This argument does not apply to full privatisation to foreign investors, but, as we have
already noted, the amount of such privatisation has been relatively small, especially in
countries with weak infrastructure, severe asymmetric information problems or
political instability (see Bevan and Estrin, 2001).
There is also a macroeconomic case for mass privatisation. It is argued by Roland
(2000) that mass privatisation, because it yields no government revenue, may
contribute to macroeconomic instability and does not enable the supply of public
goods to be expanded. However, an alternative point of view is that when shares are
distributed free, there is no need for buyers to access funds such as bank credit.
Consequently, inflationary pressure is not generated and the interest rate is not driven
up, i.e., the cost of borrowing for real investment is unaffected.
  17  Hence, mass
privatisation can have beneficial macroeconomic effects. Furthermore, our analysis
indicates that the argument with respect to public goods is a weak one: governments
do not use revenue effectively. This is a general point. Support for privatisation
                                                                                                                                           
suggests that, if one considers all transition countries together over the period since the start of reform,
the more positive initial view of mass privatisation was correct.
16 This argument is strengthened if the income distribution inherited from the communist era was
especially misaligned with the ability to run firms.
17 This argument is reinforced by the existence of a macroeconomic stock-flow constraint (see Sinn and
Sinn, 1991; Bolton and Roland, 1992), whereby the total savings in a country are too small to enable
the government to realise through full privatisation an amount of revenue that it is at all commensurate
with the value of firms.25
programmes is linked to the need to remove political interference and bureaucratic
inefficiency as far as possible from firms’ operations. But it should also be taken into
account that similar political and bureaucratic considerations play a role in the
allocation of government expenditure.
18 Thus, although full privatisation is more
successful than mass privatisation in terms of the objective of raising more
(immediate) government revenue, the extent to which this is translated into faster
economic growth may be disappointing.
Our analysis has significant implications for countries, particularly developing
economies that have still to undertake large-scale privatisation programmes.  In India,
capital markets are relatively developed and macroeconomic problems are not as
severe as in much of the developing world and so direct sale may be the appropriate
form of privatisation.  A similar conclusion may apply to China.  In Africa, however,
wealth is generally concentrated in the form of rent earned from natural resource
ownership and primary production.  Capital markets are generally underdeveloped
and, inflation rates and the real cost of borrowing tend to be high. These are precisely
the conditions that favour reliance on mass privatisation.
                                                
18 See World Bank (1997) for an extended discussion of the effectiveness of the state, which is
typically found to be particularly low in poor countries.26
Table 1:
Average Values of Macroeconomic Series, 1990-2001
Country GDPg INV EMPLg IHCg GISg
Albania 1.50 11.74 -1.80 3.11 6.76
Armenia -1.84 -1.66 -1.37 -1.44 4.76
Azerbaijan -3.68 7.13 -0.87 1.60 -4.77
Belarus -0.71 -5.14 -1.65 2.81 1.02
Bulgaria -2.32 -3.70 -3.69 2.62 16.34
Croatia -1.07 3.75 -2.11 3.26 10.53
Czech Rep. 0.22 2.49 -1.41 4.52 -1.61
Estonia 2.71 7.22 -2.53 5.14 -2.75
FYR Macedonia -2.67 -1.45 -3.99 1.30 3.29
Georgia -1.70 35.34 0.72 3.58 2.67
Hungary 0.78 3.06 -3.10 10.52 -1.63
Kazakhstan -1.74 -4.42 -1.22 3.59 -2.49
Kyrgyz Rep. -2.43 -3.96 0.49 10.86 -0.31
Latvia -1.88 7.56 -2.51 11.79 11.94
Lithuania -2.43 -4.62 -2.11 6.06 -2.73
Moldova -9.92 -10.96 -3.62 4.14 -13.23
Poland 2.23 5.24 -1.50 11.45 1.09
Romania -1.54 -2.81 -1.87 8.80 -0.35
Russia -3.16 -11.16 -1.40 3.55 -0.10
Slovak Rep. 0.68 1.70 -1.97 4.33 0.03
Slovenia 1.48 5.14 -0.37 8.10 0.45
Ukraine -5.95 -12.37 -0.50 3.78 -1.51
Uzbekistan -0.99 -8.35 -1.28 -5.42 7.30
Mean -1.50 0.86 -1.72 4.70 1.51
Std. Dvt. 2.75 9.98 1.20 4.14 6.17
All figures are annual average rate of growth per cent.







Privatisation Primary Method Secondary Method
Albania Mixed 1995 MEBO vouchers
Armenia Mass 1994 vouchers MEBO
Azerbaijan Mass 1997 vouchers direct sales
Belarus Mixed 1994 MEBO vouchers
Bulgaria Full 1993 direct sales vouchers
Croatia Mixed 1992 MEBO vouchers
Czech Republic Mass 1992 vouchers direct sales
Estonia Full 1993 direct sales vouchers
FYR Macedonia Mixed 1993 MEBO direct sales
Georgia Mass 1995 vouchers direct sales
Hungary Full 1990 direct sales MEBO
Kazakhstan Full 1994 direct sales vouchers
Kyrgyzstan Mass 1996 vouchers MEBO
Latvia Full 1992 direct sales vouchers
Lithuania Mass 1991 vouchers direct sales
Moldova Mass 1995 vouchers direct sales
Poland Full 1990 direct sales MEBO
Romania Mixed 1992 MEBO direct sales
Russia Mass 1993 vouchers direct sales
Slovak Republic Full 1995 direct sales vouchers
Slovenia Mixed 1998 MEBO vouchers
Ukraine Mass 1994 vouchers MEBO
Uzbekistan Mixed 1996 MEBO direct sales
Note: Year of privatisation was established based on EBRD information on Primary Method









Albania 1991 Small scale privatisation
Albania 1992
Albania 1993 Privatisation agency established
Albania 1994










Bulgaria 1992 Privatisation law introduced
Bulgaria 1993 Large scale privatisation direct sales
Bulgaria 1994
Bulgaria 1995








Czech Republic 1991 Small scale privatisation and restitution
Czech Republic 1992 Voucher privatisation vouchers
Czech Republic 1993











Slovakia 1991 Small scale privatisation
Slovakia 1992 Voucher privatisation
Slovakia 1993
Slovakia 1994








Hungary 1990 Large scale privatisation direct sales

















Poland 1993 Mass privatisation begins
Poland 1994 National Investment Funds (NIF) established
Poland 1995 State enterprises allocated to NIFs
Poland 1996







Romania 1991 Voucher privatisation




Voucher  privatisation (2
nd wave) & new
privatisation law adopted
Romania 1996







Armenia 1991 Small scale privatisation
Armenia 1992 Privatisation law introduced
Armenia 1993
Armenia 1994 Voucher privatisation vouchers














Large scale privatisation  & privatisation law
(on large scale privatisation) adopted
Azerbaijan 1996 Small scale privatisation









Belarus 1993 Privatisation law adopted










Estonia 1991 Small scale privatisation
Estonia 1992 Large scale (tender) privatisation
Estonia 1993














Georgia 1993 Small scale privatisation
Georgia 1994












Kazakstan 1994 Voucher privatisation
Kazakstan 1995 Privatisation law adopted








Kyrgyzstan 1991 Small scale privatisation
Kyrgyzstan 1992 Corporatisation of enterprises
Kyrgyzstan 1993 Corporatisation of enterprises
Kyrgyzstan 1994
Kyrgyzstan 1995








Latvia 1991 Small scale privatisation
Latvia 1992






























Moldova 1993 Cash privatisation
Moldova 1994










Russia 1992 Voucher privatisation (takes place in October)
Russia 1993 vouchers
Russia 1994 Cash privatisation










Ukraine 1992 Small scale privatisation
Ukraine 1993


















































Slovenia 1992 Privatisation law adopted
Slovenia 1993 Privatisation law amended
Slovenia 1994 New privatisation law adopted
Slovenia 1995 Privatisation agency established
Slovenia 1996 Approve privatisation plans
Slovenia 1997
Slovenia 1998
Privatisation law amended and Slovene






MEBO refers to Management and Employee Buy Out
1.   The year that appears in bold is the year of privatisation, chosen on the basis
of the date when privatisation of the dominant mode was conducted. If no such
year exists, establishment of the Privatisation Agency and passing of
privatisation laws is taken as an indicator of the privatisation year.
2.  Main method of privatisation is provided by EBRD and refers to the dominant
privatisation (MEBO, direct stales or voucher) in the particular country.36
Table 4:
Growth equations, on 1990-2001













Time Dummies Yes ***







No. of observations 244
No. of parameters 44
No. of individuals 23
Tests Stat. Value P-value
Wald (joint): Chi^2(10) 169.300 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(34) 4075.000 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(11) 46.750 [0.000]
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 0.977 [0.339]
AR(2) test N(0,1) -0.243 [0.808]
The regression includes fixed effect, time effect, and White’s correction for robust
standard errors.
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10%37
Table 5:
Growth equations on 1990-2001:




19 Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs
GDPg(-1) 0.191 0.880** -0.055 0.129
INVg 0.070 0.020*** 0.090 0.036**
EMPLg 0.116 0.074 0.281 0.080***
IHCg 0.054 0.023** 0.044 0.026*
GISg 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.009
PrivSS 0.076 0.084 -0.150 0.146
Stock MC 1.002 0.347*** 2.624 1.500*
PrivSS*StockMC -0.014 0.005*** -0.037 0.020*
Mass 7.626 2.812*** 24.157 4.738***
Full -0.046 1.599 -5.008 8.316
Mixed 1.775 1.763 14.827 5.770**
Constant -6.280 3.342* -0.880 3.923
Dummies Yes/No Significance Yes/No Significance
Time Dummies Yes *** Yes ***





Sigma levels - 6.206
RSS 5756.313 12864.701
TSS 18043.836 10871.371
No. observations 233 210
No. parameters 44 43
No. Individuals 23 23
Tests Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value P-value
Wald (joint): Chi^2(11) 180.400 [0.000] Chi^2(11) 166.200 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(33) 7574.000 [0.000] Chi^2(32) 189.500 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(10) 32.710 [0.000] Chi^2(10) 23.830 [0.008]
Sargan test - - - Chi^2(89) 73.910 [0.875]
AR(1) test: N(0,1) -1.499 [0.134] N(0,1) -2.691 [0.007]
AR(2) test N(0,1) 0.313 [0.754] N(0,1) 0.827 [0.408]
All the regressions: Fixed effect, time effect, and White’s correction for robust standard
errors.
(1):  OLS model including lagged dependent variable.
(2):  GMM model instrumenting GDPg, INVg, EMPLg, IHCg and GISg
Transformation used: First differences
Level instruments: Dummies, Gmm(GDPg,1,2), Gmm(INVg,1,2),
Gmm(EMPLg,1,2), Gmm(IHCg,1,2), Gmm(GISg,1,2)
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10%
                                                
19 In the GDP model the coefficients refer to level variables; in the GMM model the coefficients refer
to first differences (dINVg, dEMPLg, etc.)38
Table 6:
Growth equations on sub-samples, 1990-1995 and 1996-2001
Interacting Private Sector Share and Stock Mkt Capitalisation
Regression
(1) – 1990-1995 (1) – 1996-2001 (2) – 1990-1995 (2) – 1996-2001
Variable Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs
INVg 0.071 0.025*** 0.101 0.029*** 0.071 0.026*** 0.094 0.029***
EMPLg 0.193 0.156 0.277 0.068*** 0.166 0.161 0.292 0.067***
IHCg 0.085 0.036** -0.040 0.015*** 0.064 0.035* -0.038 0.015***
GISg -0.020 0.016 0.002 0.004 -0.021 0.016 0.002 0.004
PrivSS 0.170 0.163 0.241 0.089*** 0.176 0.166 0.281 0.086***
Stock MC 0.049 0.206 0.091 0.040** 5.333 2.131** 1.064 0.443**
PrivS*StockMC - - - - -0.076 0.030** -0.013 0.006**
Mass 1.001 5.231 12.467 2.826*** 1.080 5.271 10.947 2.915***
Full 1.075 2.599 0.000 - 1.543 2.662 0.000 -
Mixed 4.245 3.292 -0.886 0.460* 4.574 3.051 -1.628 0.540***
Constant -4.188 3.085 -10.404 6.329* -3.446 3.129 -13.600 6.056**
Dummies Yes/no Significance Yes/no Significance Yes/no Significance Yes/no Significance
Time Dummies Yes *** No - Yes *** No -
Group Dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Indicators Value Value Value Value
Sigma 7.681 3.072 7.577 3.021
Sigma^2 59.085 9.440 57.405 9.129
R^2 0.545 0.644 0.563 0.659
RSS 4660.860 906.242 4477.606 867.290
TSS 10237.700 2543.732 10237.700 2543.732
No. observations 116 128 116 128
No. parameters 37 32 38 33
No. Individuals 23 23 23 2339
Tests Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value P-value
Wald (joint): Chi^2(9) 65.430 [0.000] Chi^2(9) 106.600 [0.000] Chi^2(10) 70.560 [0.000] Chi^2(10) 202.900 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(28) 404.500 [0.000] Chi^2(23) 386.000 [0.000] Chi^2(28) 894.000 [0.000] Chi^2(23) 420.700 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(5) 16.030 [0.007] - - Chi^2(5) 17.770 [0.003] - -
AR(1) test: N(0,1) -0.952 [0.341] N(0,1) 0.079 [0.937] N(0,1) -1.119 [0.263] N(0,1) -0.501 [0.960]
AR(2) test N(0,1) -0.891 [0.373] N(0,1) -1.189 [0.235] N(0,1) -1.036 [0.300] N(0,1) -1.376 [0.169]
All the regressions: Fixed effect, White’s correction for robust errors, Time effect when significant
(1): Interaction variable excluded
(2): Interaction variable included
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10%
Testing joint significance of 1996-2001 variables in a regressions including 1990-1995 and 1996-2001 specific regressors:
LinRes Chi^2(10) = 109.129 [0.0000] **Table 7:
Growth Equations on 1990-2001:
Replacing GISg and Stock Market Capitalisation with EBRD Indices
(Alternative definitions for the dates of privatisation)
Regression (1) (2)
Variable Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs
INVg 0.081 0.022*** 0.084 0.022***
EMPLg 0.156 0.075** 0.154 0.073**
IHCg 0.061 0.027** 0.066 0.025***
GISg 0.003 0.006 - -
Infrastructure R. Index - - 0.275 2.146
PrivSS 0.066 0.085 0.077 0.083
Stock MC - - -0.043 0.055
Banking R. Index 1.015 1.274 - -
Non-Banking R. Index -0.181 1.367 - -
Mass 6.783 3.281** 6.712 3.340**
Full 0.242 1.936 -0.108 1.970
Mixed 2.645 1.758 2.500 1.737
Constant -3.384 2.908 -2.751 2.863
Dummies Yes/No Significance Yes/No Significance
Time Dummies Yes *** Yes ***







No. observations 244 244
No. parameters 44 43
No. Individuals 23 23
Tests Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value P-value
Wald (joint): Chi^2(10) 125.600 [0.000] Chi^2(9) 130.2 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(34) 3100.000 [0.000] Chi^2(34) 1576.0 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(11) 56.000 [0.000] Chi^2(11) 51.220 [0.000]
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 1.077 [0.281] N(0,1) 1.051 [0.293]
AR(2) test N(0,1) 0.470 [0.639] N(0,1) 0.396 [0.692]
All the regressions: Fixed effect, time effect, and White’s correction for robust standard
errors.
(1): Replacing Stock Mkt Capitalisation with Banking Reform and Non-Banking-financial-
institution Reform Indices
(2): Replacing GISg with Infrastructure Reform Index
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10% Table 8:
Growth equations, on 1990-2001, for CIS and non-CIS countries
Regression
CIS countries Non-CIS countries
Variable Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs
INVg 0.046 0.020** 0.082 0.033**
EMPLg 0.194 0.140 0.116 0.044***
IHCg -0.061 0.022*** 0.007 0.026
GISg 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.014
PrivSS -0.176 0.101* 0.148 0.074**
Stock MC 0.040 0.629 0.943 0.277***
PrivSS*StockMC -0.001 0.009 -0.012 0.004***
Mass 9.171 2.832*** -5.672 2.669**
Full 5.424 2.686** -0.680 0.956
Mixed -0.341 1.458 0.672 1.146
Constant 3.547 3.013 -6.989 2.513
Dummies Yes/No Significance Yes/No Significance
Time Dummies Yes *** Yes ***







No. of observations 101 143
No. of parameters 31 34
No. of individuals 10 13
Tests Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value P-value
Wald (joint): Chi^2(10) 1280.000 [0.000] Chi^2(10) 1400.000 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(21) 265.900 [0.000] Chi^2(24) 175.000 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(11) 185.100 [0.000] Chi^2(11) 51.390 [0.000]
AR(1) test: N(0,1) -0.268 [0.789] N(0,1) -0.111 [0.912]
AR(2) test N(0,1) -0.248 [0.804] N(0,1) -1.612 [0.107]
All the regressions: Fixed effect, time effect, and White’s correction for robust
standard errors.
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10%
Testing joint significance of CIS variables in a regressions including CIS and non-CIS
specific regressors:
LinRes Chi^2(10) = 59.0053 [0.0000] **Table 9:
Growth equations, on 1990-2001
 Excluding Belarus













Time Dummies Yes ***







No. of observations 233
No. of parameters 43
No. of individuals 22
Tests Stat. Value P-value
Wald (joint): Chi^2(10) 177.300 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(33) 3917.000 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(11) 44.980 [0.000]
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 0.911 [0.362]
AR(2) test N(0,1) 0.365 [0.715]
The regression includes Fixed effect, Time effect and White’s correction for robust
standard errors.
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10%Table 10:
Growth equations, on 1990-2001
 Including Exchange rates and oil price
Regression
(1) (2)
Variable Coeff. Std. Errs Coeff. Std. Errs
INVg 0.078 0.020*** 0.078 0.023***
EMPLg 0.188 0.087** 0.218 0.092**
IHCg 0.050 0.025** -0.011 0.018
GISg 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.006
PrivSS 0.096 0.084 0.125 0.048***
Stock MC 1.077 0.412*** 1.130 0.434***
PrivSS*StockMC -0.015 0.006*** -0.015 0.006**
Exchange Rates -0.003 0.002* -0.005 0.002***
Oil Price - - 0.020 0.010*
Mass 6.564 3.444* 6.971 3.863*
Full 0.297 2.061 0.550 2.094
Mixed 1.959 1.878 2.570 1.862
Constant -2.065 2.750 -6.792 2.037***
Dummies Yes/No Significance Yes/No Significance
Time Dummies Yes *** No -







No. of observations 243 243
No. of parameters 45 35
No. of individuals 23 23
Tests Stat. Value P-value Stat. Value Pvalue
Wald (joint): Chi^2(11) 271.500 [0.000] Chi^2(12) 811.300 [0.000]
Wald (dummy): Chi^2(34) 8761.000 [0.000] Chi^2(23) 1369.000 [0.000]
Wald (time): Chi^2(11) 31.110 [0.001] - - -
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 0.827 [0.408] N(0,1) 0.457 [0.647]
AR(2) test N(0,1) -0.070 [0.944] N(0,1) 0.334 [0.739]
All the regressions: Fixed effect, and White’s correction for robust standard errors.
(1) Exchange rates and time effect
(2) Exchange rates and oil price (substituting time effect)
Significance levels:
*** : 1% or less
** : less than 5%
* : less than 10%Appendix:
List of variables
GDPg: Gross Domestic Product rate of growth;
INVg: Fixed Capital Investment rate of growth;
EMPLg: Employment rate of growth;
IHCg: Investment in Human Capital rate of growth
GISg: Government Investment Share rate of growth
PrivSS: Privatisation Sector Share
StockMC: Stock Market Capitalization
Mass Priv. D.: Mass Privatisation Dummy
Full Priv. D.: Full Privatisation Dummy
Mixed Priv. D.: Mixed Privatisation Dummy
Mass1: Mass Privatisation Dummy with alternative definitions
Full1: Full Privatisation Dummy with alternative definitions
Mixed1: Mixed Privatisation Dummy with alternative definitions
Mass2: Mass Privatisation Dummy with alternative date setting
Full2: Full Privatisation Dummy with alternative date setting
Mixed2: Mixed Privatisation Dummy with alternative date setting
Infrastructure R. Index: EBRD Index of Infrastructure Reform
Banking R. Index: EBRD Index of Banking Sector Reform
Non-Banking R. Index: EBRD Index of Reform of Non-Banking Financial Instit.References
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Washington.The paper uses data from every transition economy identified by the EBRD on GDP,
fixed capital investment, private sector share in GDP, mode and date of privatisation,
employment, tertiary education, government capital expenditure, stock market
capitalisation and reform indices. The basic  criteria in collection of data and its
processing has been comparability over time and across countries. In the analysis,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were
excluded because the data was either of dubious  quality or unavailable in most years.
To provide a point of comparison for all the countries which are being analysed, a
common source for the base year had to be used. The most comprehensive and
methodologically consistent source for 1989 is the World Bank’s “ Historically
Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data”. Its 1989 figures therefore served as a basis
for series on GDP, Fixed Capital Investment and Investment as a share of GDP, which
were extended using EBRD times series. Other data series were obtained from various
sources, including National Statistical Offices and Central Banks, IMF, EBRD and
other international organisation. A detailed description of the methodology follows
below.
GDP
GDP growth rates for all the 23 countries was obtained from EBRD  Transition
Reports 1995, 1998, 1999 and 2002, taking the most recent information on annual
GDP percentage changes the period 1989-2001.
GDP level figures had to be used to obtain data on fixed capital investment growth at least in
the early years of the 1990s because the annual percentage change in investment was not
available. These GDP data were used to calculate a fixed capital investment figures by taking
fixed capital investment to GDP ratios, provided by IMF and National Statistics sources. The
details of GDP level calculations are presented below.
GDP level
(Former) Soviet Union – annual GDP figures were sourced from the World Bank’s
“Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data” for 1988, using data in
constant 1987 market prices. To allow for comparison, these figures were converted
into US dollars using the 1987 exchange rate. To obtain information on GDP growth
in all thirteen constituent countries, the total USSR figure was divided into Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Russia,  Ukraine and Uzbekistan by using UN, World Bank and national
sources. Data for 1989-2000 were obtained by extending the series from 1988 using
EBRD  real GDP growth rates covering 1989-2001 and taking the 1988 figure as the
base for the extension.
Data Appendix(Former) Yugoslavia – annual GDP figures were sourced from the World Bank’s
“Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data” for 1988, using data in
constant 1987 market prices.  To allow for comparison, these figures were converted
into US dollars using the 1987 exchange rate. Country data for Slovenia,  Macedonia
and Croatia were obtained by dividing the total Yugoslavia figures, using UN, World
Bank and national sources. Data for 1989-2000 were obtained by extending the series
from 1988 using EBRD  real GDP growth rates covering 1989-2001 and taking the
1988 figure as the base for the extension.
Czech Republic and Slovakia – annual GDP figures were sourced from the World
Bank’s “Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data” for 1988, using data
in constant 1987 market prices.  To allow for comparison, these figures were
converted into US dollars using the 1987 exchange rate. The total figure was divided
according to information obtained from UN, World Bank and national sources. Data
for 1989-2000 were obtained by extending the series from 1988 using EBRD real
GDP growth rates covering 1989-2001 and taking the 1988 figure as the base for the
extension.
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland - annual GDP figures were sourced from the
World Bank’s “ Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data” for 1988,
using data in constant 1987 prices.  To allow for comparison, these figures were
converted into US dollars using the 1987 exchange rate. Data for 1989-2001 were
obtained by extending the series from 1988 using EBRD real GDP growth rates
covering 1989-2001 and taking the 1988 figure as the base for the extension.
Albania - annual GDP figures were sourced from the World Bank’s “ Historically
Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data” for 1988, using data in constant 1986
market prices.  To allow for comparison, these figures were converted into US dollars
using the 1986 exchange rate. Data for 1989-2001 were obtained by extending the
series from 1988 using EBRD  real GDP growth rates covering 1989-2001 and taking
the 1988 figure as the base for the extension.
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Fixed capital investment figures were obtained from the EBRD Transition Report
1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 by taking the real gross fixed investment (GFI) rate,
measured in annual percentage change. For years where such information was
unavailable, alternative measures were used.
The most common alternative source of information was the data on investment share
in GDP provided by IMF and EBRD. For consistency across countries and over time,
investment levels were obtained from the same source as the GDP level data. Thus,
for 1989, investment data were obtained  from  the World Bank’s “ Historically
Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data”.  For this purpose, gross domestic
investment in 1987 local prices was converted into US dollars using the 1987
exchange rate. The main additional sources were UN Economic Surveys of Europe,
IMF (for Former Soviet Union) and Yugoslavia Statistical Yearbooks.  It was then
supplemented by using information on the fixed capital investment to GDP ratio.To extend the series to the 1993-2001 period, EBRD real gross fixed investment rate
was used, taking the 1992 figure as the base in most cases. National sources and IMF
or EBRD were used for the 1990 and 1991 data.
EMPLOYMENT
Information on employment growth was obtained from EBRD employment time
series, measured in annual percentage change. This data cover the 1989-2001 period.
INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL
The measure chosen for investment in human capital was gross enrolment in tertiary
education. The enrolment ratio is defined as the total number of students in a certain
level of education as a percentage of the total population in the age group considered
to be most common at this education level.
The data were obtained using TransMonee Database, produced by UNICEF, by taking
5 year period averages. These series were preferred to the UNESCO data, which is
largely inconsistent with the World Bank data and also shows unconvincingly high
growth of enrolment rates for several countries.
The definition of tertiary education and the relevant group ages  vary somewhat from
country to country.
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT SHARE IN GDP
This data were derived from the measurement of government capital expenditure
provided by the IMF Country Reports. For CIS countries, information on early years
of transition was unavailable from this source, so we relied on the CIS National
databases.
For Baltic countries, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies (located
in Riga) has provided additional data:
-  for Estonia: data for 1991 and 1995;
-  for Latvia: data for 1994 and 1995;
-  for Lithuania: data for 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
In the years for which information was unavailable, in CIS countries in the 1990s, the  data
were extrapolated by taking the average of the following three years.
PRIVATE SECTOR SHARE IN GDPThe information on private sector share as percentage of GDP was taken from the
EBRD Transition Report 1999 and 2002.
STOCK MARKET CAPITALISATION AS A SHARE IN GDP
Data were collected from the EBRD Transition Report 2002, and is consistent with
Emerging Stock Market Facts Book.
Since in many transition countries the stock market did not exist in the early 1990s, a
“zero” value was assigned.
INDICES OF REFORM
Three indices were used in the regressions: EBRD Infrastructure Reform Index,
EBRD Banking Sector Reform Index and EBRD Index for Reform of Non-Banking
Financial Institutions. Data were sourced from the EBRD Transition Report 2002.
PRIVATISATION DATE AND MODE
Information on privatisation mode was sourced from EBRD Transition Report 1995
and 2002. This classified privatisation methods into voucher privatisation, manager
and employee buyouts (MEBO), or direct sales.  The date of privatisation was chosen
based on the year in which the dominant type of privatisation took place.NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
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